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We study financial systems from a game-theoretic standpoint. A financial system is represented by a network,
where nodes correspond to firms, and directed labeled edges correspond to debt contracts between them. The
existence of cycles in the network indicates that a payment of a firm to one of its lenders might result to some
incoming payment. So, if a firm cannot fully repay its debt, then the exact (partial) payments it makes to each
of its creditors can affect the cash inflow back to itself. We naturally assume that the firms are interested in
their financial well-being (utility) which is aligned with the amount of incoming payments they receive from
the network. This defines a game among the firms, that can be seen as utility-maximizing agents who can
strategize over their payments.
We are the first to study financial network games that arise under a natural set of payment strategies
called priority-proportional payments. We investigate both the existence and the (in)efficiency of equilibrium
strategies, under different assumptions on how the firms’ utility is defined, on the types of debt contracts
allowed between the firms, and on the presence of other financial features that commonly arise in practice.
Surprisingly, even if all firms’ strategies are fixed, the existence of a unique payment profile is not guaranteed.
So, we also investigate the existence and computation of valid payment profiles for fixed payment strategies.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: financial networks, equilibria, price of anarchy, price of stability
1 INTRODUCTION
A financial system comprises a set of institutions, such as banks and firms, that engage in financial
transactions. The interconnections showing the liabilities (financial obligations or debts) among
the firms are represented by a network and can be highly complex. Hence, the wealth and financial
well-being of a firm depends on the entire network and not just on the well-being of its immediate
borrowers/debtors. For example, a possible bankruptcy of a firm and the corresponding damage
to its immediate lenders/creditors resulting from the firm’s failure to repay (known as credit risk),
can be propagated through the financial network by causing the creditors’ (and other firms’, in
sequence) inability to repay their debts, thus having a global effect.
In this work, we examine the global effect of payment decisions of individual firms. We assume
that each firm has a fixed amount of external assets (not affected by the network) which are measured
in the same currency as the liabilities. A firm’s total assets comprise its external assets and its
incoming payments, and can be used for (outgoing) payments to its creditors. A firm’s payment
decision, for example, can specify the priority to be given to each of its debts or creditors. An
authority (such as the government or the court) is assumed to monitor the decisions of the firms
in order to guarantee that they comply with general regulatory principles, such as the absolute
priority and the limited liability ones (see, e.g., [8]). According to these principles, a firm can leave
a liability unpaid only if its assets are not enough to fully repay its liabilities. In particular, the
absolute priority principle requires that all creditors must be paid off before a firm’s stakeholders can
split assets, and the limited liability principle implies that a firm that does not have enough assets to
pay its liabilities in full, has to spend all its remaining assets to pay its creditors. Surprisingly, not
all decisions of the firms lead to valid solutions (or payment profiles)
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, or there can be ambiguity




An example of such a network appears in [20] and assumes the presence of default costs and Credit Default Swaps
(definitions appear in Section 2).
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Consider, for example, four firms A, B, C, and D, with zero external assets each, and the following liabilities: A owes ℓ
coins to B and another ℓ coins to C; B owes ℓ coins to A and another ℓ coins to D. Assume that the payment strategy of firm
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rise to the clearing problem aiming to determine the final payment profile of the network for fixed
individual payment decisions. Such payments are called clearing payments and are compatible with
the given individual payment decisions. Computing clearing payments is a necessary step before
performing a game-theoretic analysis.
We investigate the consequences of individual firm decisions in clearing from a game-theoretic
standpoint [15]. Following the recent work of Bertschinger et al. [4], we diverge from the common
assumption of proportionality in payments, that dictates that a firm pays its creditors proportionally
to their respective liabilities. We assume that firms strategize about their payments by appropriately
deciding the priority of their payment actions, consistently with a predefined payment scheme
(and the current regulation); the chosen priorities may have an effect on the amount of incoming
payments of a given firm. We consider a natural payment scheme that allows fixed allocations of
creditors to priority-classes independently of the available assets. We refer to this payment scheme
as priority-proportional scheme, and the strategies that conform with it as priority-proportional
strategies.
Our paper is the first to perform a game-theoretic analysis of priority-proportional payments
in financial networks. Payments with priorities are simple to express as well as quite common
and very well-motivated in the financial world. Indeed, bankruptcy codes allow for assigning
priorities to the payout to different creditors, in case an entity is not able to repay all its obligations.
Such a distribution of payments can be part of a reorganization plan ordered by the court [3].
Priority classes in bankruptcy law have also been considered in [10, 12], among others. Moving
beyond regulated financial contexts, similar behavior is common in everyday transactions between
individuals with pairwise debt relations. This is the first time that the impact of priority-proportional
payments is assessed in a strategic setting, as are other elements of our analysis, even though such
payments have been considered in the past (most recently by Papp and Wattenhofer [16]). Our
work demonstrates that, despite their simplicity, priority-proportional strategies exhibit certain
desired properties with respect e.g., to equilibria existence and quality. They are also not very
restrictive, which can, however, lead to unattractive instances. Our work can be seen as an attempt
to examine whether such priority-based payment plans are indeed stable equilibria; this can be
useful from a mechanism design perspective.
Our game-theoretic analysis considers two different definitions of utility motivated by the
financial literature, namely total assets, computed as the sum of external assets and incoming
payments, or equity, respectively. Traditionally, the financial health of a firm has been measured
by its equity, which is equal to the amount of remaining assets after payments (total assets minus
liabilities) if this is positive, and 0 otherwise. This means that all firms that have more debt than
assets have equity 0, so equities fail to capture the potentially different available assets these firms
might have. Total assets can be seen as a refinement of the equities: indeed, for any financially
healthy firm (that can repay all its debt) its total assets equal its equity plus its liabilities (a fixed
term), while for other firms, total assets allow them to distinguish among different states that are
indistinguishable in terms of equity. Note that, since by the absolute priority principle a firm is
obliged by law to fully repay all its creditors if it has enough assets, it is only the payment decisions
of firms whose debt is more than their assets that can have an effect on the network. For this reason,
computing the firms’ utility as their total assets is a suitable approach in a game-theoretic context.
Overall, both definitions are aligned with the individual financial wealth and welfare of a firm.
A is to prioritize payments towards B over C, and that the payment strategy of firm B is to prioritize payments towards A
over D (firms C and D are not strategic since they do not have multiple creditors—or any for that matter). Then there exist
infinitely many valid solutions that are consistent with this strategy profile: Indeed, A paying B the amount of _ coins and
B paying A the same amount (_ coins), is a valid solution for any positive value _ ≤ ℓ .
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Our model is based on the seminal and widely adopted work of Eisenberg and Noe [8] who
provide a basic financial network model, i.e., proportional payments, non-negative external assets,
and debt-only liabilities. In addition to considering a different payment scheme, we enhance the
basic model by also considering financial features commonly arising in practice, such as default
costs [17], Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts [20], and negative external assets [7] (definitions
appear in Section 2). We analyze the efficiency of the states arising from various clearing payments
of financial networks, with a focus on ones consistent with equilibrium strategies. Note that even
though, as stated above, both utility definitions are aligned with the individual financial wealth
and welfare of a firm, it turns out that these notions of individual utility are not always aligned
with the welfare of the whole financial system.
Our contribution. We quantify the extent to which strategic behavior of the firms affects the
welfare of the society, by analyzing the financial network games that are defined by a particular
utility function, and possibly allow the presence of other financial instruments. In particular, we
consider financial network games under priority-proportional strategies, defined for different utility
functions, such as total assets or equities, and which potentially allow CDS contracts, default costs,
or negative external assets. We derive structural results that have to do with the existence, the
computation, and the properties of clearing payments for fixed payment decisions in a non-strategic
setting, and/or the existence and quality of equilibrium strategies. In particular, in Section 3 we
prove the existence of maximal clearing payments under priority-proportional strategies, even
in the presence of default costs, and provide an algorithm that computes them efficiently. We are
then able to prove existence of equilibria when the utility is defined as the equity, but show that
equilibria are not guaranteed to exist when the utility is captured by the total assets. We then turn
our attention to the efficiency of equilibria and provide an almost complete picture of the price of
anarchy [13] and the price of stability [2, 21]. Our results for total assets appear in Section 4, while
the case of equities is treated in Section 5.
Related work. Financial networks and their related properties have been analyzed in various
works that follow the standard (non-strategic) model developed by Eisenberg and Noe [8]. They
introduce a financial network model allowing debt-only contracts among firms with non-negative
external assets that make proportional payments. Among other results, they prove that there always
exist maximum and minimum clearing payments and they identify sufficient conditions so that
uniqueness is guaranteed; they also present a simple iterative algorithm that computes them in
polynomial time.
Following the model introduced by Eisenberg and Noe [8], a series of papers extend and enrich
the model by adding default costs [17], cross-ownership [9, 22], liabilities with various maturities
[1, 14] and CDS contracts [16, 20]. In [17], Rogers and Veraart prove the existence of maximal
clearing payments in the presence of default costs and provide an algorithm that computes them.
Schuldenzucker et al. [20] extend the previous models by introducing CDS contracts and show
that, in general, there can be zero or many clearing payments. Furthermore, they provide sufficient
conditions for the existence of unique clearing payments. Demange [7] proposes a model that allows
for firms to be indebted to entities outside the network, and captures this by allowing negative
external assets.
The strategic aspects of financial networks have been considered very recently. Most relevant
to our setting is the paper by Bertschinger et al. [4] who also study the inefficiency of equilibria
in financial networks. They follow the standard model of [8] and focus mainly on two payment
schemes, namely coin-ranking and edge-ranking strategies, while also considering the total assets
(as opposed to equity) as a measure of the individual utility of each firm. Apart from defining
the graph-theoretic version of the clearing problem, they present a large range of results on the
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existence and quality of equilibria. Our work extends this line of research by considering a different
payment scheme (which extends edge-ranking strategies by allowing ties in the ranking) and the
possibility of additional common financial features (default costs, CDS contracts, and negative
external assets). In a similar spirit, Papp and Wattenhofer [16] consider the impact of individual
firm actions, such as removing an incoming debt, donating extra funds to another firm, or investing
more external assets, when CDS contracts are also allowed. They mostly focus on the case where
firms have predefined priorities over their creditors and they remark that even by redefining such
priorities, a firm cannot affect its equity.
Schuldenzucker and Seuken [18] consider the problem of portfolio compression, where a set
of liabilities forming a directed cycle in the financial network may be simultaneously removed,
if all participating firms approve it. They consider questions related to the firms’ incentives to
participate in such a compression, while Schuldenzucker et al. [19] show that finding clearing
payments when CDS contracts are allowed is PPAD-complete. Additional strategic considerations,
albeit less related to our setting, are the focus of Allouch and Jalloul [1] who consider liabilities
with two different maturity dates and study how firms may strategically deposit some amount from
their first-period endowment in order to increase their assets in the second period, while Csóka
and Herings [6] consider liability games and study how to distribute the assets of a firm in default,
among its creditors and the firm itself.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In the following, we denote by [𝑛] the set of integers {1, . . . , 𝑛}. The critical notions of this section
and their graphical representation are presented in an example (Figure 1), at the end of this Section.
Financial networks. Consider a set N = {𝑣1, . . . , 𝑣𝑛} of 𝑛 firms, where each firm 𝑣𝑖 initially has
some external assets 𝑒𝑖 corresponding to income received from entities outside the financial system;
note that 𝑒𝑖 may also be negative.
Firms have payment obligations, i.e., liabilities, among themselves. These are in the form of a
simple debt contract or of a Credit Default Swap. A debt contract creates a liability 𝑙0𝑖 𝑗 of firm 𝑣𝑖 (the
debtor) to firm 𝑣 𝑗 (the creditor); we assume that 𝑙
0
𝑖 𝑗 ≥ 0 and 𝑙0𝑖𝑖 = 0. Note that both 𝑙0𝑖 𝑗 > 0 and 𝑙0𝑗𝑖 > 0
may hold. Firms with sufficient funds to pay their obligations in full are called solvent firms, while
ones that cannot are in default. The recovery rate, 𝑟𝑘 , of a firm 𝑣𝑘 that is in default, is defined as the
fraction of its total liabilities that it can fulfill. A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a conditional liability
of (1− 𝑟𝑘 )𝑙𝑘𝑖 𝑗 of the debtor 𝑣𝑖 to the creditor 𝑣 𝑗 , subject to the default of 𝑣𝑘 , called the reference entity.




𝑘∈[𝑛] (1 − 𝑟𝑘 )𝑙𝑘𝑖 𝑗 . Let 𝐿𝑖 =
∑
𝑗 𝑙𝑖 𝑗 be the
total liabilities of firm 𝑣𝑖 and set l = (𝐿1, . . . , 𝐿𝑛).
Let 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 denote the payment from 𝑣𝑖 to 𝑣 𝑗 ; we assume that 𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. These payments define a
payment matrix P = (𝑝𝑖 𝑗 ) with 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ [𝑛]. Then, 𝑝𝑖 =
∑
𝑗 ∈[𝑛] 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 represents the total outgoing
payments of firm 𝑣𝑖 , while p = (𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) is the payment vector; this should not be confused with
the breakdown of individual payments of firm 𝑣𝑖 that is denoted by p𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖1, . . . , 𝑝𝑖𝑛). A firm in
default may need to liquidate its external assets or make payments to entities outside the financial
system (e.g., to pay wages). This is modeled using default costs defined by values 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ [0, 1]. A firm
in default can only use an 𝛼 fraction of its external assets (when this is positive) and a 𝛽 fraction of
its incoming payments. The absolute priority and limited liability regulatory principles, discussed
in the introduction, imply that a solvent firm must repay all its obligations to all its creditors, while
a firm in default must repay as much of its debt as possible, taking default costs also into account.
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Summarizing, it must hold that 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 ≤ 𝑙𝑖 𝑗 and, furthermore, P = Φ(P), where
Φ(x)𝑖 =
{





𝑗=1 𝑥 𝑗𝑖 , otherwise.
(1)
Payments P that satisfy these constraints are called clearing payments3. We define the notion
of proper clearing payments, which are clearing payments where all the money circulating in the
financial network have originated from some firm with positive external assets. In the following,
we only consider proper clearing payments.
Financial network games. These games arise naturally when we view the firms as strategic agents.
We denote the strategy of firm 𝑣𝑖 by 𝑠𝑖 (·); this dictates how 𝑣𝑖 allocates its existing funds, for any
possible value these might have. Similarly, we can define the strategy profile s = (𝑠1 (·), . . . , 𝑠𝑛 (·)).
Given clearing payments P, we define firm 𝑣𝑖 ’s utility using either of the following two notions.
The total assets 𝑎𝑖 (P) (see also [4, 5]) are




while the equity 𝐸𝑖 (P) (see also [16]) is
𝐸𝑖 (P) = max{0, 𝑎𝑖 (P) − 𝐿𝑖 }.
Proportional payments have been frequently studied in the financial literature (e.g., in [7, 8,




}. Note that, when constrained to use proportional payments, there is no strategic
decision making involved.
We focus on priority-proportional payments, where a firm’s strategy is independent of its total
assets and consists of a complete ordering of its creditors allowing for ties. Creditors of higher
priority must be fully repayed before any payments are made towards creditors of lower priority,
while creditors of equal priority are treated as in proportional payments. For example, a firm 𝑣𝑖
having firms 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 as creditors may select strategy 𝑠𝑖 = (𝑎, 𝑏 |𝑐 |𝑑) that has firms 𝑎, 𝑏 in the




denote the total liability of firm 𝑣𝑖 to firms in its𝑚-th priority class. We use parameters
𝑘𝑖 𝑗 to imply that firm 𝑣 𝑗 is in the 𝑘𝑖 𝑗 -th priority class of firm 𝑣𝑖 and denote by 𝜋
′
𝑖 𝑗 the relative liability














= 0. For given priority-proportional strategies for all firms, the clearing payments P (see
Equation (1)) must also satisfy








ª®¬ · 𝜋 ′𝑖 𝑗 , 0
 , 𝑙𝑖 𝑗
 . (2)
That is, the payment of 𝑣𝑖 to a creditor in priority class 𝐿
(𝑘𝑖 𝑗 )
𝑖
occurs only after all payments to




proportionally to their claims in that priority class. Finally, we also have 0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 ≤ 𝑙𝑖 𝑗 .
We will now define the notion of Nash equilibrium in a financial network game. First, let us
stress that a strategy profile has consistent clearing payments which are not necessarily unique.
It is standard practice (see, e.g. [8, 17]) to focus attention to maximal clearing payments (such
payments point-wise maximize all corresponding payments) to avoid this ambiguity. So, we say
3
Clearing payments are not necessarily unique.
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that a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if no firm can increase her utility by deviating to
another payment strategy. We only consider pure Nash equilibria and clarify that the utility of a
firm for a given strategy profile is computed based on the assumption that the maximal clearing
payments will be realized every time. In Section 3, we show how we can compute such payments
efficiently. Extending strategy deviations to coalitions and joint deviations, we are interested in
strong equilibria where no coalition can cooperatively deviate so that all coalition members obtain
strictly greater utility.
Social welfare. Given clearing payments P, the social welfare 𝑆𝑊 (P) is the sum of the firm
utilities; the particular utility notion (total assets or equities) will be clear from the context. The
optimal social welfare is denoted by 𝑂𝑃𝑇 . Let Peq be the set of clearing payments consistent with
(pure) Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. The price of anarchy (PoA) of a particular instance is
defined as the worst-case ratio of the optimal social welfare over the social welfare achieved at
any equilibrium at the instance, PoA = maxP∈Peq
𝑂𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑊 (P) . In contrast, the price of stability (PoS) of
a given instance of a game measures how far the highest social welfare that can be achieved at
equilibrium is from the optimal social welfare, i.e., PoS = minP∈Peq
𝑂𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑊 (P) . The Price of Anarchy
(Price of Stability, respectively) of a game is the maximum PoA (PoS, respectively) of any instance of
the given game.
Example 2.1. We represent a financial network by a graph as follows. Nodes correspond to firms
and black edges correspond to debt-liabilities; a directed edge from node 𝑣𝑖 to node 𝑣 𝑗 with label
𝑙0𝑖 𝑗 implies that firm 𝑣𝑖 owes firm 𝑣 𝑗 an amount of money equal to 𝑙
0
𝑖 𝑗 . Nodes are also labeled, their
label appears in a rectangle and denotes their external assets; we omit these labels for firms with
external assets equal to 0. A pair of red edges (one solid and one dotted) represents a CDS contract:
a solid directed edge from node 𝑣𝑖 to node 𝑣 𝑗 with label 𝑙
𝑘
𝑖 𝑗 and a dotted undirected edge connecting
this edge with a third node 𝑣𝑘 implies that firm 𝑣𝑖 owes 𝑣 𝑗 an amount of money equal to (1 − 𝑟𝑘 )𝑙𝑘𝑖 𝑗 .
Figure 1 depicts a financial network with five firms having external assets 𝑒1 = 𝑒4 = 1 and
𝑒2 = 𝑒3 = 𝑒5 = 0. There exist four debt contracts, i.e., firm 𝑣1 owes 𝑣2 and 𝑣3 two coins and one coin,
respectively; 𝑣2 owes 𝑣1 one coin, and 𝑣3 owes 𝑣5 one coin. There is also a CDS contract between
𝑣4, 𝑣5, and 𝑣3, with nominal liability 𝑙
3
45
= 1, with 𝑣4 being the debtor, 𝑣5 the creditor, and 𝑣3 the










Fig. 1. An example of a financial network.
In this network, only 𝑣1 can strategize about its payments, hence we focus just on 𝑣1’s strategy:
• Let 𝑣1 select the priority-proportional strategy 𝑠1 = (𝑣2 |𝑣3). Then, the payment vector would






and 𝑝45 = (1 − 𝑟3)𝑙3
45
= 1. The total assets of the firms are 𝑎1 (P) = 2, 𝑎2 (P) = 2, 𝑎3 (P) = 0,
𝑎4 (P) = 1 and 𝑎5 (P) = 1, and the social welfare is 𝑆𝑊 (P) = 6.
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• If 𝑣1’s strategy is 𝑠 ′1 = (𝑣3 |𝑣2), the only consistent payment vector would be p′ = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
with p′
1
= (0, 0, 1, 0, 0). Then, 𝑎1 (P′) = 1, 𝑎2 (P′) = 0, 𝑎3 (P′) = 1, 𝑎4 (P′) = 1 and 𝑎5 (P′) = 1,
resulting in 𝑆𝑊 (p′) = 4.
• If 𝑣1 decides to pay proportionally, that is 𝑠 ′′1 = (𝑣2, 𝑣3), the payment vector would be p′′ =
(2, 1, 2/3, 1/3, 0) with p′′
1




(1 − 𝑟3) = 1(1 − 𝑝35𝑙35 ) = 1/3.
Then, 𝑎1 (P′′) = 2, 𝑎2 (P′′) = 4/3, 𝑎3 (P′′) = 2/3, 𝑎4 (P′′) = 1 and 𝑎5 (P′′) = 1, resulting in
𝑆𝑊 (P′′) = 6.
Comparing the total assets under the different strategies discussed above, 𝑣1 would select either
strategy (𝑣2 |𝑣3) or (𝑣2, 𝑣3), returning the maximum possible total assets (i.e., 2). Therefore, any
strategy profile s where either 𝑠1 = (𝑣2 |𝑣3) or 𝑠1 = (𝑣2, 𝑣3) is a Nash equilibrium.
3 EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF CLEARING PAYMENTS
This section contains our results relating to the existence and the properties of clearing payments
in priority-proportional games. We begin by arguing that, given a strategy profile, proper clearing
payments always exist even in presence of default costs. Furthermore, in case there are multiple
clearing payments, there exist maximal payments, i.e., ones that point-wise maximize all corre-
sponding payments, and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that computes them. Note that
this result is in a non-strategic context, but it is necessary in order to perform our game-theoretic
analysis as it allows us to argue about well-defined deviations by considering clearing payments
consistently among different strategy profiles.
Lemma 3.1. In priority-proportional games with default costs, there always exist maximal clearing
payments under a given strategy profile.
We now show how such maximal clearing payments can be computed. Given a strategy profile
in a priority-proportional game, Algorithm 1 below, that extends related algorithms in [8, 17],
computes the maximal (proper) clearing payments in polynomial time. In particular, and since the
strategy profile is fixed, we will argue about the payment vector consisting of the total outgoing
payments for each firm; the detailed payments then follow by the strategy profile.
Lemma 3.2. The payment vectors computed in each round of Algorithm 1 are pointwise non-
increasing, i.e., p(`) ≤ p(`−1) for any round ` ≥ 0.




= 𝐿𝑖 if 𝑣𝑖 ∈ N \ D0, so it suffices to compute 𝑝 (0)𝑖 and show that 𝑝
(0)
𝑖
≤ 𝐿𝑖 for 𝑣𝑖 ∈ D0.
We wish to find the solution x to the following system of equations
𝑥𝑖 = 𝛼𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽
(∑
𝑗 ∈D0 𝑥 𝑗𝑖 +
∑
𝑗 ∈N\D0 𝑙 𝑗𝑖
)
, ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ D0
𝑥𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 , ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ N \ D0 (3)
































ª®¬ < 𝐿𝑖 = 𝑥 (0)𝑖
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Algorithm 1:MCP
/* The algorithm assumes given strategies (priority classes). For ease of
exposition, we denote by 𝑝 (^)
𝑖
the total outgoing payments of firm 𝑣𝑖 at
round ^ and by p(^) the vector of total outgoing payments at round ^. */



















4 if D` ≠ D`−1 then

















ª®¬ , ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ D`
𝐿𝑖 , ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ N \ D` .
;
6 Set ` = ` + 1;
7 go to Line 2;
8 else
9 Run Proper(p(`−1) )
Algorithm 2: Proper(x)
/* The algorithm takes in input payments x and returns proper payments. */
1 Set Marked = {𝑣𝑖 : 𝑒𝑖 > 0} and Checked = ∅;
2 while Marked ≠ ∅ do
3 Pick 𝑣𝑖 ∈ Marked;
4 for 𝑣 𝑗 ∉ Marked ∪ Checked with 𝑥𝑖 𝑗 > 0 do
5 Marked = Marked ∪{𝑣 𝑗 };
6 Marked = Marked \{𝑣𝑖 } and Checked = Checked ∪{𝑣𝑖 };
7 for 𝑣𝑖 ∉ Checked do
8 Set all outgoing payments from 𝑣𝑖 in x to 0;
9 Return x
where the inequality holds because 𝛼, 𝛽 ≤ 1 and by our assumption that 𝑣𝑖 ∈ D0. Hence, sequence
x(𝑘) is decreasing. Since the solution to Equation (3) is non-negative, x can be computed as x =
lim𝑘→∞ x(𝑘) , which completes the base of our induction.

















is the solution x to the following system of equations











ª®¬ , ∀𝑖 ∈ D`+1
𝐿𝑖 , ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ N \ D`+1
(4)


























































































where we note that our assumption p(`) ≤ p(`−1) implies thatD`+1 ⊇ D` . Now we can split the set
D`+1 into D` and D`+1 \ D` . For 𝑣𝑖 ∈ D` we have 𝑥 (1)𝑖 = p(`) = 𝑥
(0)
𝑖






































which implies that the sequence 𝑥 (𝑘) is decreasing. Since the solution to Equation (4) is non-negative,
x = p`+1 can be computed as x = lim𝑘→∞ x(𝑘) , which completes our claim that p(`) ≤ p(`−1) for
any round ` ≥ 0. □
Theorem 3.3. Algorithm 1 computes the maximal clearing payments under priority-proportional
strategies in polynomial time.
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Proof. The algorithm proceeds in rounds. In each round `, tentative vectors of payments,
p(`) = (𝑝 (`)
1
, . . . , 𝑝
(`)
𝑛 ), and effective equities, 𝐸 (`) , are computed. At the beginning of round 0, all
firms are marked as tentatively solvent, which we denote by D−1 = ∅; D` is used to denote the
firms in default after the `-th round of the algorithm. The algorithm works so that once a firm is in
default in some round, then it remains in default until the termination of the algorithm. Indeed, by
Lemma 3.2 the vectors of payments are non-increasing between rounds and the strategies are fixed.
Algorithm Proper is called when D` = D`−1, which requires at most 𝑛 rounds; clearly, each round
requires polynomial time. The running time of Proper is also polynomial. Indeed, note that each
firm can enter set Marked at most once and will leave Marked to join set Checked after each
other firm is examined at most once.
Regarding correctness, we start by proving by induction that the payment vector provided as
input to Algorithm 2 is at least equal (pointwise) to the maximal clearing vector p∗. As a base of
our induction, it is easy to see that p(−1) = l ≥ p∗. Now assume that p(`−1) ≥ p∗ for some ` ≥ 0; we
will prove that p(`) ≥ p∗. We denote by D∗ the firms in default under the maximal clearing vector
p∗, i.e., D∗ =
{






. Our inductive hypothesis p(`−1) ≥ p∗ implies D` ⊆ D∗.
Hence, for firms 𝑣𝑖 ∈ N \ D` , we have p(`)𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 ≥ 𝑝∗𝑖 . For 𝑣𝑖 ∈ D` we refer to the proof of Lemma










































Recursion (5) then implies that 𝑥 (𝑘) ≥ p∗ for all 𝑘 and hence p(`+1) = x = lim𝑘→∞ x𝑘 ≥ p∗.
We have now proved that the input to Algorithm 2 is at least equal (pointwise) to the desired
maximal clearing vector p∗. However, by Lemma 3.2 we also know that p(`) ≤ p(`−1) for all ` ≥ 0.
It holds by design that the input of Algorithm 2 is a clearing vector, so p∗ is the only possible such
input.
Finally, it remains to show that Algorithm 2 with input the maximal clearing payments computes
the maximal proper clearing payments. Indeed, consider some maximal clearing payments P and
the resulting proper payments P′ obtained by P via Algorithm 2. We note that P′ are clearing
payments since the payments that are deleted, in the first place only reached firms whose outgoing
payments are decreased to zero as well. Clearly, if P′ are not maximal proper clearing payments,
then there exist proper clearing payments P̃ with 𝑝 ′𝑖 𝑗 < 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 for some firms 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 𝑗 . If 𝑝
′
𝑖 𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 we
obtain a contradiction to the maximality of P, otherwise if 𝑝 ′𝑖 𝑗 < 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 , then P̃ cannot be proper. The
claim follows. □
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4 MAXIMIZING THE TOTAL ASSETS
We now turn our attention to financial network games under priority-proportional strategies when
the utility is defined as the total assets. We note that in this case, the maximal clearing payments,
computed in Section 3 are weakly preferred by all firms among all clearing payments of the given
strategy profile; indeed, the utility is computed as the sum between a fixed term (external assets) and
the incoming payments which are by definition maximized. So, in case of various clearing payments,
it is reasonable to limit our attention to the (unique) maximal clearing payments computed in
Section 3.
We begin with a negative result on regarding the existence of Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.1. Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist when firms aim to maximize their total
assets.
Next, we aim to quantify the social welfare loss in Nash equilibria when each firm aims to
maximize its total assets. While the focus is on financial network games under priority-proportional
payments, we warm-up by considering the well-studied case of proportional payments, where we
show that these may lead to outcomes where the social welfare can be far from optimal.
Theorem 4.2. Proportional payments can lead to arbitrarily bad social welfare loss with respect to
total assets. In acyclic financial networks, the social welfare loss is at most a factor of 𝑛/2 and this is
almost tight.
We remark that, given clearing payments with proportional payments, a firm may wish to
deviate.
Remark 4.2.1. Proportional paymentsmay not form aNash equilibriumwhen firms aim tomaximize
their total assets.
We now turn our attention to priority-proportional strategies. To avoid text repetitions, we omit
referring to priority-proportional games in our statements. We start with a positive result on the
quality of equilibria when allowing for default costs in the (extreme) case 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0.
Theorem 4.3. The price of stability is 1 if default costs 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0 apply and firms aim to maximize
their total assets.
In the more general case, however, the price of stability may be unbounded, as the following
result suggests. Recall that the setting without default costs corresponds to 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1.
Theorem 4.4. The price of stability is unbounded if default costs 𝛼 > 0 or 𝛽 > 0 apply when firms
aim to maximize their total assets.
Proof. We begin with the case where 𝛽 > 0 and consider the financial network shown in Figure
2(a) where 𝑀 is arbitrarily large. Firm 𝑣1 is the only firm that can strategize about its payments. Its
strategy set comprises (𝑣2 |𝑣3), (𝑣3 |𝑣2), and (𝑣2, 𝑣3), which result in utility 1 + 𝛽 , 1, and 1 + 2𝛽
3
𝑀+2𝛽−2𝛽3 ,
respectively; note that, unless 𝑣1 selects strategy (𝑣2 |𝑣3), 𝑣2 is also in default as𝑀 is arbitrarily large.
For sufficiently large 𝑀 , we observe that any Nash equilibrium must have 𝑣1 choosing strategy
(𝑣2 |𝑣3), leading to clearing payments p1 = (0, 𝛽2 + 𝛽, 0, 0, 0), p2 = (𝛽, 0, 0, 0, 0), p3 = p4 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
and p5 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) with 𝑆𝑊 (P) = 2 + 𝛽2 + 2𝛽 . Now, when 𝑣1 chooses strategy (𝑣3 |𝑣2), we obtain
clearing payments p′
1
= (0, 0, 𝛽, 0, 0), p′
2
= (0, 0, 0, 0, 0), p′
3
= (0, 0, 0, 𝑀, 0), p′
4
= (0, 0, 𝑀, 0, 0), and
p′
5
= (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) with 𝑆𝑊 (P′) = 2𝑀 + 2 + 𝛽 . The claim follows since 𝑂𝑃𝑇 ≥ 𝑆𝑊 (P′).
Now, let us assume that 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 = 0 and consider the financial network shown in Figure
2(b). Again, firm 𝑣1 is the only firm that can strategize about its payments. 𝑣1’s total assets when


















(b) The case where 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 = 0
Fig. 2. The instances used in the proof of the unbounded price of stability.
choosing strategies (𝑣2 |𝑣3), (𝑣3 |𝑣2), and (𝑣2, 𝑣3) are 1 + 𝛼 , 1, and 1, respectively; note that when 𝑣1
chooses strategy (𝑣2, 𝑣3), firm 𝑣2 is also in default as it receives a payment of 2𝛼
2
1+2𝛼 which is strictly
less than 𝛼 for any 𝛼 > 0. Hence, in any Nash equilibrium 𝑣1 chooses strategy (𝑣2 |𝑣3), resulting
in clearing payments p1 = (0, 𝛼, 0, 0), p2 = (𝛼, 0, 0, 0), p3 = p4 = (0, 0, 0, 0) with social welfare
𝑆𝑊 (P) = 1 + 2𝛼 . The optimal social welfare, however, is achieved when 𝑣1 chooses strategy (𝑣3 |𝑣2),
resulting in clearing payments p′
1
= (0, 0, 𝛼, 0), p′
2
= (0, 0, 0, 0), p′
3
= (0, 0, 0, 𝑀), and p′
4
= (0, 0, 𝑀, 0)
with 𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 2𝑀 + 1 + 𝛼 . □
We now show that the price of stability may also be unbounded in the absence of default costs,
if negative external assets are allowed.
Theorem 4.5. The price of stability is unbounded if negative external assets are allowed and firms
aim to maximize their total assets.









Fig. 3. A financial network with unbounded price of stability.
payments. Clearly, 𝑣1’s total assets equal 3, unless 𝑣2 pays its debt (even partially). This is only
possible when 𝑣1 chooses strategy (𝑣2 |𝑣3) and prioritizes the payment of 𝑣2 (note 𝑣2’s negative
external assets will “absorb” any payment that is atmost 2). Therefore, the resultingNash equilibrium
leads to the clearing payments p1 = (0, 3, 1, 0), p2 = (1, 0, 0, 0), p3 = (0, 0, 0, 0), p4 = (0, 0, 0, 0) with
social welfare 𝑆𝑊 (P) = 4. However, when 𝑣1 chooses strategy (𝑣3 |𝑣2) we obtain the clearing
payments p′
1
= (0, 0, 3, 0), p′
2
= (0, 0, 0, 0), p′
3
= (0, 0, 0, 𝑀), p′
4
= (0, 0, 𝑀, 0) with social welfare
𝑆𝑊 (P′) = 2𝑀 + 2. Hence, since 𝑂𝑃𝑇 ≥ 𝑆𝑊 (P′) we obtain the theorem. □
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The proof of Theorem 4.5 in fact holds for any type of strategies as 𝑣1 always prefers to pay in
full its liability to 𝑣2. This includes the case of a very general payment strategy scheme, namely
coin-ranking strategies [4] that are known to have price of stability 1 with non-negative external
assets.
Next, we show that the price of anarchy can be unbounded even without default costs, CDS
contracts, and negative externals. Bertschinger et al. [4] have shown a similar result for coin-
ranking strategies, albeit for a network that has no external assets; our result extends to the case
of coin-ranking strategies and strengthens the result of [4] to capture the case of proper clearing
payments.
Theorem 4.6. The price of anarchy is unbounded when firms aim to maximize their total assets.
5 MAXIMIZING THE EQUITY
In this section we consider the case of equities. Similarly, the social welfare is defined as the sum of
equities. We present interesting properties of clearing payments and observe that Nash equilibria
always exist in such games, contrary to the case of total assets.
5.1 Existence and properties of equilibria
We warm up with a known statement in absence of default costs. In particular, each firm obtains the
same equity under all clearing payments, so it does not have a preference; this provides additional
justification to our choice to focus on maximal clearing payments computed in Section 3, in case of
various clearing payments.
Lemma 5.1 ([11]). Each firm obtains the same equity under different clearing payments, given a
strategy profile. That is, given the firms’ strategies, for any two different (not necessarily maximal)
clearing payments P and P′, it holds 𝐸𝑖 (P) = 𝐸𝑖 (P′) for each firm 𝑣𝑖 .
Lemma 5.1 also indicates that, for any given strategy profile, any firm is always either solvent or
in default in all resulting clearing payments. We exploit this property to obtain the following result;
this extends a result by Papp and Wattenhofer (Theorem 7 in [16]) which holds for the maximal
clearing payments.
Theorem 5.2. Even with CDS contracts, any strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, when firms aim
to maximize their equity. This holds even if the clearing payments that are realized are not maximal.
Note that Lemma 5.1 no longer holds once default costs are introduced; see e.g., Example 3.3 in
[17] where both firms may be in default or solvent depending on the clearing payments. The next
result extends Theorem 7 in [16] to the setting with default costs, and guarantees the existence of
Nash equilibria (and actually strong ones) when firms wish to maximize their equity.
Theorem 5.3. Even with default costs and negative external assets, any strategy profile is a strong
equilibrium when firms aim to maximize their equity.
5.2 (In)efficiency of equilibria
We start by noting that Lemma 5.1 together with Theorem 5.2 imply the following, which we note
holds for any payment scheme.
Corollary 5.4. The price of anarchy in financial network games with CDS contracts is 1 when
firms aim to maximize their equity.
The above positive result, however, no longer holds when default costs or negative external
assets exist. For these cases we derive the following results.
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Theorem 5.5. The price of anarchy with default costs (𝛼, 𝛽) when firms aim to maximize their
equity, is
(a) 1 when 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0,
(b) unbounded when: i) 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1), ii) 𝛽 = 0 and 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1], or iii) 𝛽 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0,
(c) at least 1/𝛼 − Y, if 𝛽 = 1 and 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) for any Y > 0.
Proof. We begin with the case 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0. We claim that all strategy profiles correspond to the
same clearing payments hence admit the same social welfare. It suffices to observe that neither the
strategy of a solvent firm, nor the strategy of a firm in default, affect the set of firms in default and
consequently the clearing payments. Consider two strategy profiles s and t. A firm 𝑖 that is solvent
under s, will be solvent and continue to make payments 𝑝𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 under any strategy (given the
strategies of everyone else), i.e., will be solvent at the clearing payments consistent with strategy
vector (𝑡𝑖 , s−𝑖 ), derived by s if firm 𝑖 alone changes her strategy from 𝑠𝑖 to 𝑡𝑖 . On the other hand,
a firm 𝑖 that is in default under s, will similarly remain in default under (𝑡𝑖 , s−𝑖 ) and continue to
make 0 payments since 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0, thus not affecting the set of firms in default. The claim follows
by considering the individual deviations from 𝑠𝑖 to 𝑡𝑖 of all firms 𝑖 sequentially and observing that











Fig. 4. The instance in the proof of Theorem 5.5, where we assume 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1).
Regarding the case 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1), consider the financial network in Figure 4. Clearly, only firm 𝑣2
can strategize and observe that it is always in default irrespective of its strategy. When 𝑣2 selects
𝑠2 = (𝑣4 |𝑣3), we obtain the clearing payments p1 = (0, 1𝛽2 − 1, 0, 0), p2 = (0, 0, 0,
1+𝛽
𝛽 (𝛽2+𝛽+1) ), p3 =
(0, 𝛽 (1+𝛽)
𝛽2+𝛽+1 , 0, 0), and p4 = (0, 0,
1+𝛽
𝛽2+𝛽+1 , 0). Since 𝑣2, 𝑣3 and 𝑣4 are in default, we have 𝑆𝑊 (P) = 0.
When, however, 𝑣2 selects strategy 𝑠
′
2
= (𝑣3 |𝑣4), we obtain the clearing payments p′1 = (0, 1𝛽2 −
1, 0, 0), p′
2




= (0, 1, 0, 0), and p′
4
= (0, 0, 0, 0). Now, 𝑣2 and 𝑣4 are in default and we
have 𝑆𝑊 (P′) = 1/𝛽 − 1. Since 𝑂𝑃𝑇 ≥ 𝑆𝑊 (P′), the claim follows.
Regarding the case 𝛽 = 0 and 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1], consider the financial network in Figure 5 and note that
𝑣2 is always in default irrespective of its strategy. If 𝑣2 selects strategy 𝑠2 = (𝑣6 |𝑣3), then 𝑣6 ends up
having equity 𝛼 . However, strategy (𝑣3 |𝑣6) is also an equilibrium strategy for 𝑣2, but it results in
each firm having equity 0.
v2v3v4 v6
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Fig. 5. The instance in the proof of Theorem 5.5, when 𝛽 ∈ {0, 1} and 𝛼 ≠ 𝛽 .
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Regarding the remaining case, i.e., 𝛽 = 1 and 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1), consider again the financial network
in Figure 5. As before, 𝑣2 is always in default. If 𝑣2 selects strategy (𝑣3 |𝑣6), then 𝑣5 ends up having
equity𝑀 + 2𝛼 . However, (𝑣6 |𝑣3) is also an equilibrium strategy for 𝑣2, but it results in equity 2𝛼 for
𝑣6, equity 𝛼𝑀 for 𝑣5 and equity 0 for the remaining firms; the theorem follows. □
We complement this result with a tight upper bound when 𝛽 = 1.
Theorem 5.6. The price of anarchy with default costs (𝛼, 1) when firms aim to maximize their
equity is at most 1/𝛼 . This holds even if the clearing payments that are realized are not maximal.
Proof. Consider any clearing payments P and let 𝑆 (P) and 𝐷 (P) be the set of solvent and in
default firms under P. Recall that for any firm 𝑣𝑖 , we have 𝐸𝑖 (P) = max{0, 𝑎𝑖 (P) − 𝐿𝑖 }. For any firm
𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 (P), it holds that 𝐸𝑖 (P) = 𝑒𝑖 +
∑
𝑗 ∈[𝑛] 𝑝 𝑗𝑖 −
∑
𝑗 ∈[𝑛] 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 , as
∑
𝑗 ∈[𝑛] 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 = min{𝑒𝑖 +
∑
𝑗 ∈[𝑛] 𝑝 𝑗𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖 }.
Similarly, for any 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐷 (P), we have 𝐸𝑖 (P) = 𝛼𝑒𝑖 +
∑
𝑗 ∈[𝑛] 𝑝 𝑗𝑖 −
∑
𝑗 ∈[𝑛] 𝑝𝑖 𝑗 , since 𝛽 = 1. By summing





























Clearly, the social welfare is maximized when 𝐷 (P) = ∅, i.e.,𝑂𝑃𝑇 ≤ ∑𝑖∈[𝑛] 𝑒𝑖 , while it is minimized
when 𝐷 (P) includes all firms, i.e., 𝐸 (P) ≥ 𝛼 ∑𝑖∈[𝑛] 𝑒𝑖 ; this completes the proof. □
Extending the setting to allow for negative external assets again may lead to unbounded social
welfare loss.
Theorem 5.7. The price of anarchy is unbounded when negative external assets are allowed and
firms aim to maximize their equity.
Still, in the presence of default costs or negative external assets, Theorem 5.3 leads to the next
positive result.
Corollary 5.8. The strong price of stability is 1 even with default costs and negative external
assets.
If we relax the stability notion and consider the price of stability in super-strong equilibria, where
a coalition of firms deviates if at least one strictly improves its utility and no firm suffers a decrease
in utility, then we obtain a negative result.
Theorem 5.9. The price of stability in super-strong equilibria is unbounded when negative external
assets are allowed and firms aim to maximize their equity.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Wehave studied strategic payment games in financial networkswith priority-proportional payments
and we have presented an almost full picture both with respect to structural properties of clearing
payments as well as the quality of Nash equilibria.
Our work reveals several interesting open questions. In particular, an interesting restriction
on the strategy space is to always prioritize strategies that could lead to incoming payments, i.e.,
when each firm 𝑖 always ranks higher a payment that might create a cash flow through a directed
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cycle (in the liabilities graph) back to 𝑖 , than a payment that does not. While some of our negative
results would still hold, e.g., Theorem 4.1, others, such as Theorem 4.4, crucially rely on the reverse
ranking. Furthermore, one could consider addressing computational complexity questions like
deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists or computing a Nash equilibrium when it is guaranteed
to exist, for the case of total assets.
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